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Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has indicated that she intends to do everything in her
power to keep Scotland within the EU following the UK’s decision to leave on 23 June. But how
would other EU states react to the prospect of Scotland staying within the EU? Paul Anderson
writes on the position of Spain, which is generally viewed as having a stake in blocking Scottish
membership due to the existence of independence movements in Catalonia and the Basque
Country. He suggests that it is unlikely Spain would block Scottish membership given the support
for it in other EU countries, but that a Spanish veto cannot be ruled out.
A week is a long time in politics. On Thursday 23 of June, 52 per cent of the British electorate voted in favour of the
United Kingdom seceding from the European Union. Three days later, the Spanish electorate, for the second time in
six months, went to the polls to elect a new Spanish government. The incumbent Partido Popular (PP) won most
seats, 137, but is 39 seats short of an overall majority. In both cases, the future is unknown and unchartered territory
will have to be navigated.
Negotiations are already underway in Spain regarding the formation of a new government, perhaps a grand
coalition between the two biggest rival parties (the PP and PSOE). In the UK, however, the resignation of Prime
Minister David Cameron means the withdrawal of the UK form the EU will not begin immediately. If Harold Wilson
was right in quipping ‘a week is a long time in politics’, anything beyond will truly seem like an eternity.
Brexit and Scottish independence
The UK is a plurinational state composed of four nations. While this was a nation-wide referendum, the diﬀering
results from the four nations have become the focus of the debate thus far. In England and Wales, over 50% in both
nations voted in favour of leave. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, however, over 50% voted to remain. Is the UK’s
constitutional ediﬁce about to crumble? With calls for a second independence referendum in Scotland, Sinn Fein’s
support for a border poll on the uniﬁcation of Ireland, and even calls for the independence of London, several
irreparable cracks have appeared in the foundations of the UK’s constitutional ediﬁce.
Following the vote, the Scottish ﬁrst minister, Nicola Sturgeon, announced that it would be ‘ democratically
unacceptable’ for Scotland to be dragged out of the EU when all 32 of Scotland’s local authorities voted to remain.
Consequently, ‘Indyref2’ – a second Scottish independence referendum – has been put back on the table. This
constitutional conundrum was one of the omnipresent issues of the referendum campaign, and early last year
Sturgeon urged David Cameron to agree to a ‘double majority’ rule, as is found in other countries such as
Switzerland, to ensure that the UK could not leave the EU unless voters in all nations of the UK voted in favour. In
the absence of such a rule, however, the majority support for leave in England and Wales means that Scotland and
Northern Ireland, despite overwhelmingly voting to remain, may now be obliged to leave the EU.
It is arguable that the Scottish government has every right to press for Indyref2 given the terms the SNP detailed in
its manifesto regarding another referendum– essentially ‘a material change in circumstances’ – have now been met.
And yet, the road is long. In the wake of the Brexit vote, there is, as was predicted, a renewed interest in Scottish
independence.
Many voters, particularly middle class voters, voted ‘no’ in 2014 on the premise that Scotland, as part of the UK,
beneﬁted from EU membership in terms of regional funding, political clout and voting strength . In light of the EU
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referendum, this argument no longer stands. Following the Brexit vote, opinion polls in Scotland have already
recorded a majority in favour of independence.
Another string to the SNP’s independence bow is that the EU plays a key role in the internationalist position now
endorsed by Nicola Sturgeon. A post-Brexit UK has been portrayed as a ‘diminished Little Britain’, whereas
Scotland, according to all parties in the Scottish Parliament, is instead to play an internationalist role: a force for
good on the global stage, pro-immigration, pro-freedom of movement and pro-European.
Following the referendum result, the SNP’s Alyn Smith delivered a speech to the European Parliament underlining
these points. He received a standing ovation from many of the MEPs in the parliamentary chamber. In addition,
support for Scotland to replace the UK as the 28th member of the EU is not limited to the European Parliament,
several politicians, particularly in Germany, have come out in favour of Scotland remaining in the EU.
Such enthusiasm, and indeed appetite, for another referendum, however, must be tempered with caution. It seems
likely that another Scottish referendum is now inevitable, but what remains to be seen is whether a majority of Scots
would vote to leave the UK in return for joining the EU. Despite increased talk of the likelihood of Scottish
independence (and accession to EU membership), the SNP still has signiﬁcant hurdles to overcome.
The economic case for independence, particularly in light of the reaction of the markets to Brexit and decreasing oil
and gas prices, must be improved if a signiﬁcant majority of Scots are to be convinced of the beneﬁts of ‘going it
alone’. In addition, Scotland’s currency will once again become an important, if not more important, issue. The
SNP’s insistence on a currency union with the rest of the UK is a weak position in the wake of Brexit, but support for
the euro equally remains feeble. Strategic long-term thinking on Scotland’s future currency is thus essential and
detailed consideration must ensue.
Ultimately, while it seems perfectly plausible to conclude that a second referendum on Scottish independence is
likely, the result is far from inevitable. Secession is often based on a cost-beneﬁt analysis, and the SNP, irrespective
of increased enthusiasm for independence as a reaction to Brexit, still have some intractable hurdles to overcome if
they are to ensure a signiﬁcant majority vote in favour of secession.
Timing will be key. The Scottish government will want to ensure a comfortable majority vote in favour of
independence, able to withstand what may prove to be yet another lengthy referendum campaign. More importantly,
key lessons will have been learnt from the Quebecois experience. A failed second independence vote, as occurred
in Quebec in 1995, would hugely damage the SNP and may well ensure that the independence referendums were
indeed a ‘once in a lifetime opportunity’.
The position of Spain
Article 49, whereby a European State can apply for membership of the EU, requires a unanimous decision among
member states, eﬀectively giving each country a veto over the admission of a new member. During the Scottish
referendum in 2014, there was signiﬁcant speculation that Spain, as well as other states such as Belgium or Italy,
would veto the accession of an independent Scotland to the EU in an attempt to discourage fervent independence
movements within their own borders. Given these issues are now back on the table, how might Spain be expected to
react to Scottish independence following Brexit?
In reality, the chances of a Spanish veto in 2014, though not impossible, remained unlikely. Those making the
argument above often pointed to the refusal of the Spanish government to recognise Kosovo as an independent
state. However, the position of Kosovo was fundamentally diﬀerent from that of Scotland: whereas a referendum had
been agreed between the governments of Scotland and the UK; Kosovo declared independence unilaterally.
In addition, the Spanish Premier, Mariano Rajoy, went to great lengths to discourage comparisons between Scotland
and Catalonia, arguing that both cases were ‘absolutely and totally diﬀerent’. However, Rajoy did wade in on the
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debate, questioning the validity of the SNP’s position
to re-join, not as a new member, but with a treaty
amendment using Article 48. He dismissed these
claims, instead arguing that a region that voted for
independence from a current EU member state would
be outside the Union and would have to seek entry
via Article 49. In short, they would have to navigate a
lengthy accession process to get back in.
The increasing support for independence in
Catalonia, which according to some polls had
reached over 50 per cent, evidently inﬂuenced the
position taken by the Spanish government regarding
an independent Scotland’s re-entry to the EU. While
support for independence in the Catalan region has
waned in recent months (currently around 39%), the
incumbent Catalan government continues to seek
secession, and has vowed to pursue a referendum
and independence with or without the consent of the
Spanish government, which hitherto has refused to negotiate on the issue.
The new Spanish government, regardless of its political hue, will be unequivocally opposed to Catalan
independence, yet its position on the admission of Scotland to the EU to replace the UK has yet to be clariﬁed.
Rajoy, however, currently President of the caretaker Spanish government, has made it explicitly clear he is against
Scottish negotiations, arguing ‘If the UK leaves, Scotland will leave, too’.
There are two positions the future Spanish government may take. First, it may veto Scotland joining the EU to quell
secessionist aspirations in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In addition, although it would be within the interests of
pro-secessionists in Catalonia for Scotland to be admitted to the EU, the lack of a Spanish veto would also result in
charges of ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘double standards’.
Many Catalans have contrasted the routes taken by Spain and the UK with regard to calls for secessionism.
Whereas the latter negotiated with its Scottish counterparts to ensure a fair and democratic referendum, the former
has refused to enter any such negotiations with the pro-secessionist Catalan government. Should Spain not veto an
independent Scotland’s membership to the EU, secessionist ﬁres in Catalonia may become further fuelled. It is
undoubtedly within Catalonia’s interest, however, that an independent Scotland become an EU member state, and
would likely help bolster secessionist aspirations in the region.
But it is perhaps more likely that Spain would pursue the second option, and not veto an independent Scotland’s
accession to the EU. First, as in 2014, Spain would argue that the Scottish and Catalan cases are very diﬀerent. If
Scotland is to enter the EU as an independent state to replace the UK as its 28th member, this would indeed be an
unpreceded move, and would serve to underline the diﬀerence between the Catalan and Scottish cases.
In addition, internally the future Spanish government faces huge challenges, especially with regards to the economy.
Persistently high unemployment, at over 20 per cent, economic uncertainty and corruption scandals that have even
reached the upper echelons of government, not to mention the constitutional challenge emanating from Catalonia,
will plague the new government’s ﬁrst few months and years. The increased share of the vote and seats for the PP,
compared to the general election in December, is seen as lucid evidence of the Brexit eﬀect on Spanish voters,
many of whom (74 per cent) considered Brexit as bad for the Spanish economy.
The vulnerability of the Spanish economy was a pivotal issue during the election campaign and the economic
consequences of Brexit may have ensured a last-minute swing towards the PP. The recent rhetoric of President
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Rajoy, however, who is ‘extremely against’ negotiations other than with the UK government, certainly looks set to
cause more than a few problems. Spain, at least for the moment, endorses the minority position. However, given the
rumblings of support for Catalan independence, it is still arguably the member state with most to lose should
Scotland succeed in becoming independent and a member of the EU. The prospect of a Spanish veto should
therefore not be underestimated.
The future
Many of the points raised here will be determined by what happens in the coming days, weeks, months and possibly
years. Scotland has no oﬃcial power to hold another referendum, but given the scale of the Scottish vote to remain
in the EU, political circumstances may trump legal obstacles. In addition, Scotland would have to negotiate with the
EU on the terms of its membership, and while there is enthusiasm on both sides (Scotland and other EU member
states) for Scotland remaining an EU member, timing and details will be key.
Once a new Spanish government is formed, the executive’s position on Scotland retaining EU membership will
become much clearer. However, given the inﬂuence of Brexit on the general election results, the weak and volatile
nature of the Spanish economy, and the support in other European nations, such as Poland, France and crucially
Germany, for Scotland replacing the UK as the EU’s 28th member state, it seems very unlikely that Spain would
seek to counter this.
However, while one would expect Spain to ally with its European colleagues, Rajoy’s most recent intervention
indicates this is far from certain. And therein lies the rub. Spain’s position on external aﬀairs will undoubtedly impact
upon the secessionist issue in Catalonia. The Spanish government, should it eventually decide to support an
independent Scotland’s membership, will have to walk a ﬁne line between supporting Scotland and discouraging
Catalonia. For the moment, however, such support seems highly unlikely.
Membership of the EU is the centrepiece of the independence programmes of (most) pro-secessionists in both
Scotland and Catalonia. In anchoring independence within the parameters of the EU, pro-secessionists seek to
lessen the risks of independence and assuage negative perceptions of ‘going it alone’. The vociferous claims of
national minorities demanding extended territorial autonomy or secession underline the evolving nature of
sovereignty in the modern world.
We are, in the words of Michael Keating, in an era of ‘post-sovereignty’. In Catalonia, the EU is seen as having an
‘extremely ﬂexible and pragmatic attitude in ﬁnding solutions for unforeseen problems’. The manner in which the EU
deals with the Scottish question in the wake of Brexit will undoubtedly make for interesting observation, and one
could suspect that the Catalan government will be watching with bated breath. A week or indeed a day may be a
long time in politics, but at least, for the foreseeable future, there will not be a dull moment.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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